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Abstract: 
A typical construction project involves a wide range of disparate professionals, in many cases geographically 
distributed, working together for a relatively short period of time on the design and construction of a facility. Since 
organizations are becoming flatter, culturally rich, geographically diverse and intensely competitive, the possibilities for 
conflict in such environments are greater. Negotiation is an important aspect of a project and plays an important role in 
resolving claims, preventing disputes, and keeping a harmonious relationship between project participants. Part of any 
project manager’s role as a leader is to recognize conflict, understand the sources of conflict and manage it, and to do 
this a project manager must be able to understand the basics of negotiation theory and have sufficient competencies to 
lead in such situations. To address the complex technical and human issues in negotiation, different negotiation theories 
and models are available which mainly include game theory, economic theory, and behavior theory. Since Game 
Theory provides, by its very nature, the appropriate tools for the analysis and eventual solution of conflicts of any kind, 
this paper uses a model based on Game Theory in order to identify the activities that are responsible for the delays in a 
project and divide the costs among them. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, the construction industry suffers from several problems such as high fragmentation, complexity and 
dynamicity, resource discrepancies, cost and time overruns, conflicts and disputes, etc. Since projects are becoming 
large and complex, involving multiple participants located at different places, the resources and operations of a project 
are distributed by nature [1]. The wide range of stakeholders and multiple objectives in large-scale construction projects 
inevitably cause conflicts. Construction problems also involve complexity and dynamicity. The construction sector 
represents one of the most dynamic and complex industrial environments requiring the application of different 
technologies or technical approaches [2]. The components of these large, open, and complex projects are not known in 
advance, can change over time, and consist of highly heterogeneous agents implemented by different people, at 
different times and with different software tools and techniques [3]. Resource discrepancies are also a major cause of 
change. When the timing of the tasks is not well matched with the available resources, subcontractors may try to change 
the master schedule in order to accommodate their desires. This may cause conflicts because in tightly coupled project 
schedules any move affects the tasks of other subcontractors. In most cases, these conflicts cannot easily be resolved 
simply by delaying the succeeding tasks, since task delays could extend the project completion beyond the deadline [4]. 
In these cases, subcontractors hinder their own performance as well as that of other subcontractors and ultimately the 
entire project [5]. 
According to Lei et al. [6] the possible reasons for conflict in the construction industry are the following: (i) during the 
lifecycle of construction, especially in the planning phase, the participants are confronted with enormous issues and a 
multitude of implicit and explicit interests; (ii) there are obvious differences in mental behavior, culture, temperament, 
etc., among different negotiators. Thus, their abilities, knowledge and preferences for the same issue differ too; (iii) a 
huge amount of information is required for decision-making in the construction industry. Therefore, it is difficult for 
decision-makers to grasp all the information required, the information used by every participant is unilateral and 
deficient. 
The construction industry has a long tradition of collaborative working between the members of a construction project. 
To ensure that interdependencies are properly managed, the global construction industry requires that project 
participants across the world are able to work more closely, to exchange project information in a more structured way, 
and to collaborate and co-ordinate with each other to perform construction activities in order to gain maximum 
competence [1], [3]. There is a need to develop a negotiation methodology for the project schedule optimization process 
that ensures overall optimality and resolves conflicts by negotiation among project participants [4]. The challenges are 
to find a new approach that enables project participants to identify schedule conflicts, consider alternatives, and resolve 
conflicts in a highly coupled network of related activities [5]. 
This paper uses a model based on Game Theory, defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and 
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers [7], in order to identify the activities that are responsible for 
the delays in a project and divide the costs among them. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the 
conflict in the construction industry and the basics of negotiation theories are analyzed. In section 3, game theory and 
the Core of a game are presented and, in section 4, this concept is applied to a road construction project. Finally, there is 
a concluding section with the main findings of the paper and future research. 
2. Conflicts in the construction industry 
A project can be conceived as a single continuum or recurring negotiations with multiple participants with varying 
concerns [8]. A typical construction project involves a wide range of disparate professionals (clients, architects, 
structural engineers, contractors, etc.,), in many cases geographically distributed, and working together for a relatively 
short period of time on the design and construction of a facility [9]. Since organizations are becoming flatter, culturally 
richer, geographically diverse and intensely competitive, the possibilities for conflict in such environments are greater 
and project managers must have sufficient competencies to lead in such situations [10]. 
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There are different views on conflict and the causes that originate it. Levinson [11] describes conflict as a dispute over 
resources, whereas other authors [12]-[14] believe that conflicts are either interpersonal (affective) or task/goal oriented 
(substantive). Interpersonal conflicts are clearly more intractable than task/goal conflicts and can lead to imbedded 
friction [10]. Rahim [12] contends that interpersonal conflict diminishes group loyalty, commitment, job satisfaction, 
and intention to stay in the organization. Jehn [15] and Rahim [12] suggest that while task/goal conflict may enhance 
performance under certain circumstances, the downsides are the same as for interpersonal conflicts. Conflict can arise 
from several causes such as cross-cultural differences. Many authors argue that cross-cultural training is a very strong 
mediator for avoiding and diminishing destructive conflict [16, 17]. Another method for reducing differences in cross-
cultural conflict and to help to educate people in the richness of diversity is the use of metaphors and stories [18]-[20]. 
There is a limited coverage of conflict management and negotiation in the standards for project management. The 
Australian National Competency Standard for Project management, one of the most widely recognized and referenced 
project management standards based on the nine areas of the American Body of Knowledge [21], focuses on the 
mechanisms of communication within a project but the only reference to negotiation is that of contract negotiation. 
Conflict is covered in greater detail, with the establishment of procedures for conflict resolution, the management of 
inter and intra project conflict, the reduction of client conflict, management of the resolution of contract conflict and the 
escalating of conflict issues to senior personnel. According to Hudson et al. [10], conflict management competencies 
include: reducing conflicts within project teams, not hiding or avoiding conflict but facilitating resolution, identifying 
the social behavior reflected in conflict situations, supporting the creation of healthy argumentative cultures, and being 
able to find consensus with others, aiming for win-win situations, and reacting coolly to personal attacks and forgiving 
such attacks. 
Part of any project manager’s role as a leader is to recognize conflict, understand the sources of conflict and manage it, 
and to do this a project manager must be able to understand the basics of negotiation theory. Negotiation is an important 
aspect of a project and plays an important role in resolving claims, preventing disputes, and keeping a harmonious 
relationship between project participants [22]. In a multi-person decision- making process when there are a number of 
decision-makers involved in choosing a single alternative from a set of possible alternatives, multiple disciplines and 
teamwork, different concerns caused by different preferences, experiences and background, negotiation plays an 
important role for multi-person decision-makers to select unfinished projects that will be continued, postponed or 
terminated [23]. 
Negotiation is the process of joint decision-making [24]. It is communication, direct or tacit, formal or informal, 
between individuals who are motivated to converge on an agreement for mutual benefit [25]. According to Raiffa et al. 
[26], the basic structure of negotiations in different contexts is fundamentally the same and all negotiation situations 
share four common characteristics: (i) there are two or more parties; (ii) the parties can be creative and cooperate to 
arrive at a joint decision; (iii) the payoffs to any party depend either on the consequences of the joint decision or 
alternatives external to the negotiations; (iv) the parties can reciprocally and directly exchange information, honest or 
not. 
It is widely admitted that a client and a contractor face significant difficulties in negotiating major projects. These major 
projects entail hundreds of issues and a multitude of implicit and explicit interests resulting in substantially complex 
negotiations between the client and contractor. However, project negotiations are not confined to the planning oriented 
phase culminating in contract signing. Serious bargaining often commences only after an initial settlement is reached 
and the most arduous negotiations are typically conducted during or after implementation [27]. 
Most project managers consider negotiation as the most time-and energy-consuming activity in claim management [28]. 
In addition, claim negotiation is commonly inefficient due to the diversity of intellectual background, many variables 
involved, complex interactions, and inadequate negotiation knowledge of project participants [28], [29]. 
To address the complex technical and human issues in negotiation, different negotiation theories and models are 
available which mainly include game theory, economic theory, and behavior theory [28]. Game theory is divided into 
two approaches, the axiomatic approach and the strategic approach. Under the latter, approach game theorists treat 
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economic theory as a part of game theory. On the other hand, negotiation theorists usually distinguish game theory 
(mainly referring to the axiomatic approach) from economic theory [30]. Game theory seeks to get to the essence of 
decision-making and the associated strategies in situations where two or more parties are interdependent, and where the 
outcome of their conflict and competition must be the product of their joint requirements and the interaction of their 
separate choices [31]. All the players in games are assumed to be rational, try to maximize their own utilities, and have 
complete information on the payoff function and utility function [32]. In contrast to the classical game theory approach, 
in economic theory there is no concern for the discovery of once-and-for-all strategies, but rather an intention to 
examine how the bargainers should interact in terms of their expectations of each other [33]. Economic models analyze 
the processes through which the demands of the participants converge in the course of offers and counteroffers toward 
some specific point on the contract curve [31]. In behavior theory, much attention is given to the nature of changing 
expectations and negotiators’ tactics, and to the significance of uncertainties of information, perception and evaluation, 
all matters that tend to be ignored by game theory and economic theory [34]. Behavior theory attempts to analyze the 
negotiation processes in which negotiators influence each other’s expectations, perceptions, assessments, and decisions 
during the search of an outcome. 
3. Game Theory 
Since game theory may provide, by its very nature, the appropriate tools for the analysis and eventual solution of 
conflicts of any kind in the construction industry, this paper adopts the negotiation theorist’s approach. Game theory, 
defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers 
[7], has the potential to address some of the problems facing the construction industry within a collaborative framework.  
In construction projects, conflicts among builders and owners are very common, particularly in a bidding or claiming 
situation, and game theory is a natural tool that can be used to analyze the situation systematically. Game theory focus 
on strategic interaction and conflict providing a way to think about the conflicting structure of collective decision 
making processes. 
In project management, game theory is still in the beginning of its practical applications. Branzei et al. [35] proposed 
two coalitional games related to delay cost sharing problems to determine fair shares for each of the agents who 
contribute to the delay of a project  so that the total delay cost is clear. Bergantinos and Sanchez [36] introduced a non-
transferable utility game associated to the Program and Evaluation review Technique (PERT) problem to divide the 
floats of time among the different activities. In a second paper, Bergantinos and Sanchez [37] presented two different 
approaches, one based on serial cost sharing problems and the other in game theory, to distribute the cost caused by the 
delay of a project among the firms which are responsible for it. Estevez-Fernandez et al. [38] analyzed both delayed and 
expedited problems where the penalty (reward) function is proportional with respect to the total delay (expedition) of 
the project. In a second paper, Estevez-Fernandez [39] analyzed project problems with arbitrary but non-decreasing 
penalty and rewards functions taking into account whether an activity could be started before its planned starting time. 
San Cristobal [40] applied the Shapley value to the fair allocation of gains obtained by cooperation among several firms 
carrying out a vessel drydocking who form a coalition to expedite the project. 
In a broad sense, game theory can be classified into two categories: non-cooperative game approaches, where a 
decision-making unit treats the others as competitors, and cooperative approaches where a group of decision-makers 
decide to undertake a project together in order to achieve their joint business objectives. In game theory, individuals or 
groups become players when their respective decisions, coupled with the decisions made by other players, produce an 
outcome. The options available to players to bring about particular outcomes are called strategies. Strategies are linked 
to outcomes by a mathematical function that specifies the consequences of the various combinations of strategy choices 
by all of the players in a game. A coalition refers to the formation of sub-sets of players' options under coordinated 
strategies.  
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In game theory the core is the set of feasible allocations that cannot be improved upon by a coalition. An imputation 
 nxxxx  , , , 21   is in the core of an n-person game if and only if for each subset S of N: 
 SV

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where V(S) is the characteristic function V of the subset S indicating the amount (reward) that the members of S can be 
sure of receiving if they act together and form a coalition (or the amount that members of S can get without any help 
from players who are not in S). 
Eq. (1) states that an imputation x is in the core (that x is undominated) if and only if for every coalition S, the total of 
the received by the players in S (according to x) is at least as large as V(S). The core can also be defined by Eq. (2) as 
the set of stable imputations: 
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If   


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ixSV , we say that the imputation x is unstable through a coalition S, and we say x is stable otherwise. 
The core can consist of many points.  The size of the core can even be taken as a measure of stability or how likely it is 
that a negotiated agreement is prone to be upset. In order to determine the maximum penalty (cost) that a coalition in 
the network can be sure of receiving, the linear programming problem represented by Eq. (3) is used [41]: 
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(3) 
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4. Case Study 
A vital section specified in any contract is the performance period of time of project execution. However, the real 
duration of the activities in a project is usually extended and the time required to complete it is frequently greater than 
the time specified in the contract. These overruns on time extension give rise to delays.  
Delays may be defined as an act or event that extends the time required to perform the tasks under a constraint [42]. 
They occur in every construction project and their magnitude varies considerably from project to project [43]. Strikes, 
rework, poor organization, material shortage, equipment failure, a change in orders, an “act of God”, are the main 
factors causing delays.  
Delays are disruptive and expensive. There is a universal agreement that delay is acknowledged as the most common, 
costly, complex and risky problem, representing an area of leakage in the construction industry worldwide [44]-[45]. 
Peurifoy and Ledbetter [46] identify that the construction industry is one that deals with the conversion of plans and 
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specifications into a finished product. It comprises a mixed variety of organizations that face different situations and to 
some degree similar pressures. Many of these problematic situations (cash-flow problems, equipment failures, material 
shortage, etc.) are beyond control and often lead to delay. In addition, delays are interconnected, making the situation 
even more complex and the problem can be more evident in traditional types of contract which is awarded to the lowest 
bidder [47]. 
Because of the overriding importance of time for both the owner (in terms of performance) and the contractor (in terms 
of money), delays are the source of frequent disputes and claims among owners, clients and consultants leading to 
lawsuits [43]. Such situations usually involve questioning the facts, causal factors, contract interpretations, quantum of 
the claims, mistrust, arbitration, cash-flow problems, loss of productivity and even total abandonment or termination of 
contract [48].  
When a project is delayed, the questions that emerge are: Does a particular delay warrant an extension of project 
duration and/or an extra cost? If an activity, whose real duration is greater than the planned duration, makes use of the 
expedition created by other activities, is this activity responsible for the delay? What is the maximal amount that an 
activity can be held responsible for? How can costs be divided among the activities? Despite the high number of papers 
published, most of these papers only focus on identifying factors, causes and effects of delays based on surveys of 
owners, contractors, or clients. Several papers analyze factors of delays focusing on the factors of delays in projects in 
different countries [49-53], factors that contribute to the likelihood of project delay using statistical methods [54], 
factors influencing contractor performance [55], factors affecting the analysis of inclement weather delays [56], and 
factors that lead to project delays and tools used to mitigate their effects [57]. Other papers deal with causes of delays 
focusing on the causes of these delays in projects in different countries [43], [45], [57]-[66], causes of delays and their 
importance according to project participants [67], causes of delays from the viewpoint of owners, contractors and 
architectural/engineering firms [68], causes of delays by looking at the responsibility of major parties [69], 
contributions of clients, contractors and others to time overrun [70], causes of delays with traditional type contracts, 
causes of delays to establish adequate evaluation prior to the contract award [71], causes of non-excusable delays 
identifying the factors contributing to those causes [72], perceptions of civil construction practitioners on how 
significant causes of delays are [73]. Several papers deal with other aspects of project delays as dispute resolution [74], 
tools to aid in analysis of delay claims [75], computational methods [76], delay analysis methodologies and their 
advantages or disadvantages [77]-[78], effects of project size, construction type, number of bidders on project delays 
[79] and effects on time and cost [80].   
The purpose of this section is to determine the maximum delay that an activity of a project can be held responsible for, 
and subsequently, to share the penalty associated with the total delay of the project among the activities that have 
caused this delay. To explain the proposed approach, the road construction project shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1 is 
presented. Let us consider that, when drafting the contract, the following terms are included: “A coalition is defined as 
the activity or set of activities of the network that represent a sub-path within a path. Each coalition is considered a 
player. The activities that form a coalition and are in the same path can take advantage of the expedition of the activities 
or coalitions within the same path. Any coalition cannot be held responsible for more than the total delay of the project 
but will be held responsible for, at least, ten percent of the delay caused by these coalitions individually. Each day that 
the project is delayed a penalty of 500 dollars will be applied to a coalition”.  
As we can see, in the network there are three paths and four coalitions (AB; CDE; GH; and F). In order to calculate the 
delay and expedition of the activities, and real duration of the project, the following equations are used [39]: 
      ]0,max[ ipirid   (4) 
      ]0,max[ iripie   (5) 
where p(i) and r(i) represent the planned and real time, and d(i) and e(i) represent the delay and expedition functions of 
activity i respectively. 
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The planned, real duration and float of the paths are calculated as follows: 
      Ni ippND ,  
(6) 
      Ni iirrND ,  
(7) 
     pNDlDpNFloat ,,    (8) 
 
where  pND ,  and  rND ,   are the planned and real duration of a path N , D(l) is the planned duration of the 
project (i.e., the maximum of  pND , ), and  pNFloat ,  is the maximum time that the path N  can be delayed 
without altering the duration of the project. If a path has float zero, then we say that this path is critical. 
 
Table 1. Tasks associated  with the project 
Task Description Predecessor 
A Demolitions - 
B Walls A 
C Transport of soil (dirt/gravel??) - 
D Longitudinal and transversal drainage C 
E Telecommunication infrastructures D 
F Granular and asphalt capes B,E 
G System of road signs B 
H Markings on the road G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Network associated with the project 
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Table 2 shows the planned and real time (in days), and delay and expedition of the activities after the realization of the 
project, calculated using Eqs. (4) and (5), and the planned, real duration, and float of the paths calculated using Eqs. (6), 
(7) and (8) are shown in Table 3.  
Table 2. Planned time, real time, delays and expeditions 
Task p(i) r(i) d(i) e(i) 
A 20 35 15 0 
B 40 60 20 0 
C 30 25 0 5 
D 40 30 0 10 
E 20 18 0 2 
F 70 90 20 0 
G 70 65 0 5 
H 40 35 0 5 
 
Table 3. Planned, real duration, and slack of the paths 
Path Coalitions  pND ,  Slack  pN ,   rND ,  
N1 AB-GH 170 170-170 = 0 195 
N2 AB-F 130 170-130 = 40 185 
N3 CDE-F 160 170-160 = 10 163 
 
Table 4. Coalitions, delays (days) and costs associated to each coalition 
Coalition Delay Cost Coalition Delay Cost Coalition Delay Cost 
AB 35 17,500 AB,CDE 35 17,500 AB,CDE,GH 25 12,500 
CDE 0  AB,GH 25 12,500 AB,CDE,F 35 17,500 
GH 0  AB,F 35 17,500 AB,GH,F 25 12,500 
F 10 5,000 CDE,GH 0  CDE,GH,F 15 7,500 
   CDE,F 0  N 25 12,500 
   GH,F 0     
 
The planned duration of the project, D(l), is 170 days, the maximum duration of  pND ,  that corresponds to path 
N1, but the real duration, D(r), is 195 days, the maximum duration of  rND ,  that also corresponds to path N1. Thus 
the total delay of the project is D(r)-D(l) = 25 days. By adding the delays of activities A and B, we obtain that the delay 
of the coalition (AB) is 35 days. The delay of coalition (F) is 10 days (activity F is delayed 20 days minus a float of 10). 
However, these coalitions cannot be held responsible for more than 25 days, the total delay of the project, because other 
activities of the project have been expedited. Thus, coalition (AB) is responsible for 35 days on its own but when 
forming a coalition with (GH), they are only responsible for 25 days because they take advantage of the expedition of 
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activities G and H (10 days). The delay of coalition (AB,CDE) is 35 days because, although coalition (CDE) is 
expedited 17 days, these two coalitions are in different paths of the network. The delay of the coalition (AB,F) is 45 
days, 35 days corresponds to the delay of coalition (AB) plus 10 days that corresponds to the delay of coalition (F). 
Once we have the coalitions that can be created in the project and the total delay that these coalitions can be held 
responsible for, the next step is to allocate the total penalty among the delayed coalitions and activities. Using model (3) 
and the assumptions considered at the beginning of this section, we have: 
 
Maximize  FGHCDEAB XXXX   (9) 
subject to 500,17750,1  ABX  (10) 
 000,5500  FX  (11) 
 500,17 CDEAB XX  (12) 
 500,12 GHAB XX  (13) 
 500,22 FAB XX  (14) 
 500,12 GHCDEAB XXX  (15) 
 500,17 FCDEAB XXX  (16) 
 500,12 GHFAB XXX  (17) 
 500,1 FGHCDE XXX  (18) 
 500,12 FGHCDEAB XXXX  (19) 
 0, GHCDE XX  (20) 
 0,,, GHFCDEAB XXXX  (21) 
where inequalities (10) and (11) are based on the assumption that any coalition that forms a sub-path and causes a delay 
in the project, will be held responsible for at least ten percent of the delay caused by these coalitions individually. Thus, 
coalition (AB) will be held responsible for at least 1,750 dollars and no more than 17,500 dollars (35 days) and coalition 
(F) will be held responsible for at least 500 dollars and no more than 5,000 dollars (10 days). Inequality (12) establishes 
that coalition (AB;CDE) cannot be held responsible for more than 17,500 dollars (35 days). Because coalition (AB) 
takes advantage of the expedition of coalition (GH), inequality (13) establishes that coalition (AB;GH) cannot be held 
responsible for more than 12,500 dollars (25 days). Inequality (14) establishes that coalition (AB;F) cannot be held 
responsible for more than 22,500 dollars (35 days plus 15 days). Inequalities (15)-(18) are calculated in a similar way, 
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inequality (19) establishes that, since the total delay of the project is 25 days, the maximum penalty to allocate among 
the coalitions is 12,500 dollars, and inequality (20) establishes that coalitions (CDE) and (GH) cannot be punished 
because these coalitions have been expedited. Finally, inequality (21) establishes the non-negativity constraint. 
The solution to the above linear programming problem is XAB = 11,000, XCDE = 0, XF = 1,500, and XGH = 0. This solution 
implies that, since any coalition cannot be held responsible for more that the total delay of the project, the maximum 
penalty that coalitions AB and F are responsible for is 12,500 dollars. Thus, coalition (AB) that has been delayed for 35 
days, taking advantage of the expedition of coalition (GH), is only responsible for 11,000 dollars, and coalition F, that 
has been delayed for 10 days, taking advantage of the expedition of coalition (CDE), is only responsible for 1,500 
dollars. Coalitions (CDE) and (GH) are not responsible for any delay. 
The last step is to share the cost allocated to a coalition (player) among the activities that form this coalition. This is the 
case of activities A and B, responsible for a cost of 11,000 dollars.  This amount will be shared proportionally according 
to the delay of these activities (15 and 20 days respectively) to the total delay of the coalition (35 days). Thus, the cost 
allocated to activity A is 4,714 dollars and to activity B is 6,285 dollars. 
5. Conclusion 
Part of any project manager’s role as a leader is to recognize conflict, understand the sources of conflict and manage it, 
and to do this a project manager must be able to understand the basics of negotiation theory and have sufficient 
competencies to lead in such situations. Negotiation plays an important role in resolving claims, preventing disputes, 
and keeping a harmonious relationship among project participants. The construction sector represents one of the most 
dynamic and complex industrial environments where conflicts among builders and owners are very common 
particularly in a bidding or claiming situation where owners, builders and contractors pursue their own interests at the 
expense of the others, leading to conflict or cooperation. The time required to complete the project is usually greater 
than the time specified in the contract and, because of the overriding importance of time for both the owner and the 
contractor, delays are the source of frequent disputes and claims among owners, clients and consultants, leading to 
lawsuits. There is a general consent between theorists that Game theory provides, by its very nature, the appropriate 
tools for the analysis and eventual solution of conflicts of any kind. The course of a conflict as well as its resolution 
depends on the decisions made by the various actors involved. Each party, when considering  its decisions, should take 
into account the decisions made by all the other parties. Game theory is a natural tool that can be used in such 
interactive situations where the results of the interaction depend on all the players’ decisions. 
Using the model presented in this paper, a wide variety of project situations can be modelled and placed as contractual 
obligations when drafting the contract. For example, the contract could contain terms which ensure the maximum or 
minimum penalty that an activity and/or coalition can be held responsible for. This can be performed considering 
different values in the first and last terms of the constraints. For example, inequality (11) establishes that coalition (H) 
will be held responsible for at least 500 dollars (minimum) and no more than 2,500 dollars (maximum). If these values 
are replaced, the activity and/or coalition will be held responsible for an amount between the new maximum and 
minimum values.  Limiting the period of delays can also be considered in the model by giving different values to the 
term V(N) in the model. In the application presented in this paper, the maximum amount that a coalition can be held 
responsible for is the maximum delay of the project, 25 days ($12,500). By replacing this value, the period of delays 
can be limited to the specified value. 
Who takes advantage of the delays is also possible to be represented in the model. This can be easily introduced, for 
example, setting the value of an imputation, x, equal to zero. This states that an activity, that forms a coalition with 
other activities, will not be held responsible for any delays caused by the coalition. The model is also able to represent 
situations where an activity and/or a coalition can be  penalized more than others or situations where players (i.e., 
contractors or subcontractors) are encouraged to form coalitions. These situations can be considered through the 
introduction of coefficients in the model equations, both in the objective function or in the constraints. In the objective 
function, if the coefficient of a variable (activity and/or coalition) is greater (less) than the unity, the corresponding 
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activity and/or coalition will be less (more) penalized than the rest of the activities. Similarly, contractors and 
subcontractors can be encouraged to form coalitions using these coefficients in the constraints of the model. The greater 
(less) the coefficient, the more (less) encouraged the contractors are, since they will be less (more) penalized than the 
rest of the contractors. Many other types of situations can be modelled using the model presented in this paper. The 
number of variables, equations, and inequalities needed to model these real-life situations will depend on the 
complexity of the problem. 
In order to increase the attractiveness of game theory for decision support in construction project management, the 
limitations of the model presented must also be mentioned. In game theory all players are assumed to be rational, try to 
maximize their own utilities, and have complete information on the payoff function and utility function. The assumption 
that players are perfectly rational may never match a real-life situation in a construction project. Recent developments 
in game theory pay more attention to the behavioural aspects of the players including bounded rationality, emotions, 
and intuitive decision-making. Behavioural theory focuses on the complex human factors of negotiation trying to 
analyse the negotiation processes in which negotiators influence each other’s expectations, perceptions, assessments, 
and decisions during the search for an outcome. Initially, game theory assumes that the players possess complete 
information about the strategies and payoff functions of the other players. Unfortunately, in practice this is not the case. 
To overcome this limitation, games with incomplete, imperfect  or asymmetric information are  studied more and more. 
Classical game theory assumes that each player decides in advance, before the game actually starts, what move he/she 
will make to maximize his/her own gain in any possible situation. However, the superlative rationality paradigm may 
not be the best one. Players tend to classify units as good enough or not good enough in terms of their positive attributes 
(benefit) and their negative attributes (cost) with regard to the evaluation goal.  Satisfying game theory is an approach 
that evaluates alternatives on a bipolar basis introducing supporting and rejecting options in terms of two measures, 
selectability and rejectability.  
The example used in this paper to demonstrate the validity of the model is rather simple. When dealing with real project 
networks which may contain hundreds of interrelated activities, two main approaches have been proposed in order to 
transform complex networks into simpler and more synthetic networks. The method of modular decomposition, based 
on the identification of modules that can be synthetized by equivalent macro-activities, and the method of network 
reduction based on three different types of reduction, series, parallel and node reduction. Aggregation of project 
networks using these types of methods, can help to transform complex networks into simpler and more synthetic 
networks. 
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